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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we aim to understand the transient dynamics of a
susceptible-infected (SI) epidemic spreading process on a large net-
work. The SI model has been largely overlooked in the literature,
while it is naturally a better fit for modeling the malware propaga-
tion in early times when patches/vaccines are not available, or over
a wider range of timescales when massive patching is practically
infeasible. Nonetheless, its analysis is simply non-trivial, as its im-
portant dynamics are all transient and the usual stability/steady-
state analysis no longer applies. To this end, we develop a theoret-
ical framework that allows us to obtain an accurate closed-form
approximate solution to the original SI dynamics on any arbitrary
network, which captures the temporal dynamics over all time and
is tighter than the existing approximation, and also to provide a
new interpretation via reliability theory. As its applications, we
further develop vaccination policies with or without knowledge of
already-infected nodes, to mitigate the future epidemic spreading
to the extent possible, and demonstrate their effectiveness through
numerical simulations.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Computing methodologies → Modeling methodologies; •
Security and privacy→ Malware and its mitigation;
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
There has been an explosive growth in the number of the Internet-
connected devices, ranging from traditional PCs to increasingly
prevalent mobile devices and to recently popular Internet of things
(IoT) devices. The number of connected devices on the Internet will
exceed 50 billion by 2020, according to Cisco [2]. Apart from sheer
volume, the end-device users have built a stack of rich and com-
plex networks, such as online social networks (OSNs) and the net-
works of their contacts for calls and text messaging services like
SMS/MMS and in the instant messaging applications, e.g., Skype
and GoogleHangouts, derived from their social, personal andwork
groups through which information can be shared and spread at an
unprecedented rate. The prolific connections to end devices and
users through potentially different networks clearly increase the
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risk of being exposed to malware and worm attacks and can also
be exploited as devastating vehicles for their propagation.
For example, it has been recently demonstrated in [43, 47, 55]
that a Zigbee-enabled IoT device can be reprogrammed and com-
promised by an outside attacker in its vicinity, e.g., a Zigbee ra-
dio transceiver mounted on a drone, by exploiting the Zigbee’s
over-the-air firmware update mechanism in combination with the
global firmware signing key obtained. The compromised device
can further self-propagate a worm to nearby devices via the Zig-
bee wireless connectivity and thus potentially comprise the entire
network. In a similar vein, by exploiting a buffer overflow vulner-
ability, it was shown that malware can be crafted to become a self-
replicating worm over the air and themalware propagates over the
network in a hop by hop manner [23, 24]. In fact, the emergence of
the over-the-air reprogramming protocols such as Deluge [27] and
Trickle [36] to reconfigure a sensor network or disseminate code
updates across the sensor network already gave rise to the poten-
tial misuse of its broadcasting nature to transfer malware across
the whole sensor network quickly [10, 11].
In addition, millions of OSN users have fallen prey to several
malware/worm attacks, since the trust relationships established
between OSN users can easily be exploited to spread worms [17,
25, 28, 31, 33, 64]. For instance, the Samy worm, found in October
2005, exploited a cross-site scripting vulnerability against MySpace
and infected over one million users across theMySpace within just
20 hours, by making any users viewing infected users’ profiles in-
fected and infectious to others [28]. The Koobface and Clickjacking
worms, impacting Facebook in 2009 and 2010, respectively, lever-
aged the trust relationships among OSN users to make them click
on links to malicious sites without much doubt and get infected to
automatically share the links with their friends [25, 33]. Exploiting
such trust relationships between users can be traced to any kind
of the existing communications between them, e.g., emails [21, 66],
text messages [20, 65], and instant messages [32, 54] to propagate
wormviruses through the networks of contacts andmaximize their
reachability to end hosts.
1.2 Motivation
Since exploiting the network connectivity lies at the heart of
the malware distribution, it becomes crucial to understand how
the underlying network structure affects the malware propaga-
tion over the network. This helps us understand its spreading
dynamics and eventually devise strategies for combating the mal-
ware propagation. Modeling the malware propagation and under-
standing its non-trivial properties have been active and impor-
tant research topics in many disciplines. In the literature, most
of the research efforts have been centered around the so-called
epidemic threshold for the extinction of an epidemic under the
Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible/Removed (SIS/SIR) models (and
similar variants) [7, 12, 19, 40, 51, 57, 61, 63], where a susceptible
node becomes infected with some constant rate β and an infected
node is assumed to be independently cured/removed (on its own)
with some other constant rate δ .1 The epidemic threshold here in-
dicates whether the ratio of the infection rate β to the curing rate
δ , or the ‘effective’ infection rate β/δ , is greater or less than the
reciprocal of a global network parameter λ(A) – the largest eigen-
value of the adjacency matrix A, which captures the structure of
the underlying network.
A phase transition appears at the epidemic threshold below
which the epidemic dies out eventually over time (so the network
becomes virus-free in the steady state), but above which a non-
zero fraction of nodes remain infected. Due to this dichotomic
behavior, the ‘below-the-threshold’ has been considered as the
one and only condition to be achieved in order to eradicate the
epidemic, and thus it has been the fundamental basis for the de-
velopment of immunization strategies or the control of epidemics
on a network [8, 9, 26, 52, 53, 58, 59, 62]. Specifically, the defense
mechanisms have been developed, in essence, to ensure that the
curing/recovery force across the network outweighs that of the
infection, whose spreading is further fueled by the connectivity of
the underlying network, so that the epidemic eventually dies out.
It is achieved by either increasing the curing rate δ (possibly het-
erogeneous over different nodes) or altering/pruning the network
connectivity for smaller λ(A) to disturb the epidemic spreading
over the network.
All these rich results, however, become no longer meaningful
when the patches or vaccines are not available from the beginning.
It would rather make more sense to understand the properties of
the Susceptible-Infected (SI) model that lacks the curing process,
which captures the dynamics of an epidemic in early times when
the recovery is not ready yet. Nonetheless, it has received much
less attention from the research community on epidemic modeling
and analysis [5, 40, 45], since every one eventually gets infected
and remains infected, which may be trivial in view of the steady-
state behavior and its analysis. In fact, the current literature has
been mostly limited to the steady states of epidemics propagating
over networks for the sake of tractability by resorting to the well-
established steady-state/stability analysis tools. However, for the
SI model, one would have to deal with the whole transient dynam-
ics over all time t , not just the steady-state.
1.3 Contributions
In this paper, we develop a theoretical framework to characterize
the ‘transient’ dynamics of the SI epidemic dynamics on any arbi-
trary network. We first revisit the standard SI model on a network
and discuss the limitations of the current literature. We then pro-
pose a simple yet effective technique to obtain an accurate closed-
form approximate solution to the SI epidemic dynamics over all
1In the SIS model, any infected node is cured with δ and again becomes healthy and
susceptible to infection, but in the SIR model, any infected node, once recovered, be-
comes completely cured and no longer susceptible to infection. The former captures
the cases that variants of a worm are quickly developed one after another or multiple
worms are concurrently present to continuously threaten every node, while the latter
is suitable for the propagation of a worm over the network.
time t , which effectively overcomes the limitations and becomes
tighter than the existing linearized approximation [5, 40, 45]. The
rational behind the technique is to judiciously transform the dy-
namical system governing the SI dynamics into an equivalent sys-
tem, which makes mathematical analysis amenable. Our transfor-
mation also helps discover an equivalent interpretation of the SI dy-
namics from the viewpoint of reliability theory,which is concerned
with how much longer each node would survive given its current
status. Leveraging our theoretical findings, we finally develop vac-
cination policies on how to distribute a limited amount of patches
or vaccines over the network in order to preventively mitigate
any future potential attacks and also to reactively minimize the
aftermath of an epidemic spread that already took place. We eval-
uate our vaccination policies against the eigenvector centrality-
based policy, which is backed up by the conventional linearized SI
model [5, 6, 39, 45], and the degree-based policy over real network
topology datasets, to demonstrate the efficacy of our policies.
2 PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Standard Epidemic Models on Networks
Consider a general connected, aperiodic, undirected graph G =
(N ,E) to model a network with a set of nodes N = {1, 2, . . . ,n}
and a set of edges E, indicating neighboring relationships between
nodes. The graph G is defined by ann×n adjacency matrixA= [ai j ]
with elements ai j =1 if there is an edge between nodes i and j, i.e.,
(i, j) ∈ E, and ai j = 0 if otherwise.2 Since G is connected and undi-
rected,A is irreducible, i.e., for any nodes i and j there exists some
integer k such that (Ak )i j > 0, and symmetric, i.e., ai j = aji for
all i, j [42]. Similarly for the aperiodicity of A. In the standard epi-
demic models over a graph G, the network connectivity mainly
constraints the infection process, i.e., if node i is infected and node
j is susceptible for (i, j) ∈ E, then i can spread an undesired virus
or simply infect j with a common infection rate β > 0. Sharing this
common network-constrained infection process, various epidemic
models can be related to each other.
In the standard Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) epidemic
model over an undirected graph with A, each susceptible node
becomes infected at the infection rate β per link times the num-
ber of infected neighboring nodes, while any infected node is in-
dependently cured on its own with a curing rate δ > 0 and be-
comes healthy (again susceptible to infection). The SIS model can
also be extended to the Susceptible-Infected-Removed (SIR) model
with only difference that a node, once recovered with rate δ , be-
comes completely cured and no longer susceptible to infection.
These models turn into the Susceptible-Infected (SI) model, if there
is no curing process (i.e., δ = 0), implying that a node, once in-
fected, stays infected forever and does not fall back to the suscep-
tible/removed state.
Let Xi (t) ∈ {0, 1} denote the state of node i at time t , where
Xi (t) = 1 indicates that node i is infected and Xi (t) = 0 indicates
that node i is healthy and susceptible to infection at time t . Define
xi (t) , P{Xi (t) = 1} = E{Xi (t)} ∈ [0, 1] to be the probability that
node i is infected at time t . In other words, node i is healthy at
time t with probability 1−xi (t). Let x(t), [x1(t),x2(t), . . . , xn (t)]T
2For ease of exposition, we focus on the unweighted graph in this paper, although our
theoretical results can be generalized to the weighted graph.
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be an n-dimensional column vector with elements xi (t) at time t .
Then, the SIS model is characterized by the following system of n
coupled, nonlinear differential equations [37, 45, 46, 61]: For any
node i ∈ N ,
dxi (t)
dt
= β(1 − xi (t))
∑
j∈N
ai jxj (t) − δxi (t), t ≥ t0 (1)
with a pre-specified initial conditionx(t0). Note that there are other
epidemic models. However, the traditional ones, e.g., compart-
mental model and metapopulation model, neglect the underlying
network structure and assume the homogeneous mixing popula-
tion [13, 14], in that every individual has equal chance to contact
others in the population or there are multiple homogeneous sub-
groups, which are clearly far from reality. There have also been
other epidemic ‘network’ models based on the degree-based ap-
proximation [29, 45, 49, 50], where the SIS epidemic process is
defined on the so-called configuration model, or a random graph
with a given degree distribution. It has, however, been shown
in [37, 66] that the degree-based approximation is inaccurate, be-
cause the underlying network is implicitly assumed to be tree-like
and uncorrelated over degrees, thus implying that all nodes with
the same degree are indistinguishable regardless of how they are
connected to the network.
The SIS model in (1) exhibits the existence of the epidemic
threshold τc = 1/λ(A), where λ(A) is the largest eigenvalue of A,
i.e., the spectral radius of A. If the ‘effective’ infection rate β/δ
satisfies β/δ < τc , the epidemic dies out over time, i.e., xi (∞) = 0
for all i . However, if β/δ >τc , a non-zero fraction of infected nodes
persist, 1n
∑n
i=1 xi (∞) > 0. The epidemic threshold was originally
shown in [7, 63] under a discrete-time version of (1). This has been
made precise rigorously via a stochastic analysis [19] and using
mean-field theory [61].3 Similar observation has also been made
for the SIR model [12]. Since then, there have been a great deal
of follow-up theoretical studies regarding the epidemic threshold
with its extension to different epidemic models such as SIRS, SEIR
and SIV models [40, 51, 57].4
The epidemic threshold τc has been the cornerstone of the con-
trol of epidemics on a network. The development of immunization
strategies or the control of epidemics on a network has beenmostly
made to ensure the ‘below-the-threshold’ condition β/δ < τc for
the (quick) extinction of an epidemic by either decreasing β/δ or
λ(A). For example, Many prior efforts have been made to minimize
λ(A) in order to ensure the extinction of an epidemic by removing
a set of k nodes [9, 26, 59] or k edges [8, 58, 62] from the network.
Since the node and edge removal problems are generally known
to be NP-complete [62], heuristic algorithms have been proposed
3Strictly speaking, the exact model is a sequence of (X1(t ), . . . , Xn (t )), which is an
absorbing Markov chain with 2n states having an absorbing state 0. Since this chain
is ‘finite’ and irreducible on transient states, the steady state is the absorbing state,
i.e., the extinction of the epidemic. Nonetheless, the epidemic threshold τc still plays
a critical role in determining whether the epidemic dies out fast or lasts long. For
the latter case, a non-zero fraction of infected nodes persist over a long time span of
practical interest, which is called the ‘metastable’ state. This corresponds to the case
under the exact Markovianmodel, in which the steady state 0 is only reached after an
unrealistically long time, i.e., it is in reality never reached [19, 37, 61]. The SIS model
in (1) is also known to be very accurate with large n [37, 61].
4SIRS, SEIR and SIV stand for susceptible-infected-recovered-susceptible, susceptible-
exposed-infected-recovered, and susceptible-infected-vaccinated, respectively.
for the problems based on their own way of measuring the impor-
tance of nodes and/or edges [8, 9, 26, 58, 59, 62]. Another class of
approaches has been to allow heterogeneous δi and βi over nodes
i and find the optimal δ∗i and/or β
∗
i to minimize a modified form of
λ(A) under various constraints, yet still to ensure the extinction of
an epidemic under the SIS/SIR models [46, 52, 53].
2.2 Notations
We present notations that will be used throughout the rest of the
paper. For any two column vectors u= [u1,u2, . . . ,un]T ∈Rn and
v= [v1,v2, . . . ,vn]T ∈Rn , we write
u  v if ui ≤ vi for all i = 1, 2 . . . ,n.
Similarly, wewrite u≺v ifui <vi for all i . Note that this componen-
twise inequality between vectors is a partial order, which satisfies
reflexivity, anti-symmetry, and transitivity. We denote by 1 the n-
dimensional column vector whose elements are all ones. Similarly
for 0 with all-zero elements. With a slight abuse of notation, for a
function f : R→R and for a column vector u ∈Rn , we write f (u)
as a n-dimensional column vector with elements f (ui ). Similarly,
let diag(u) be an n × n diagonal matrix with diagonal entries ui .
Let I= diag(1) be an n × n identity matrix. We adopt the standard
convention 0 log(0) = limx→0 x log(x) = 0 in this paper.
3 MOTIVATIONS FOR THE SI MODEL
We present, from practical perspectives, why the SI model is most
relevant in early times when patches/vaccines are not available, or
possibly over a wider range of timescales under constrained envi-
ronments where applying massive patches to end hosts is practi-
cally infeasible.
3.1 Practical Implications of the Epidemic
Threshold
We examine how the epidemic threshold τc plays in real network
setting. For any graph G, we observe that
max{d¯,
√
dmax} ≤ λ(A) ≤ dmax,
where d¯ is the average degree and dmax is the maximum de-
gree [38, 45]. This implies that the curing rate δ must be at least
max{d¯,√dmax} times greater than the infection rate β in order
to ensure the extinction of an epidemic. Considering the million-
to billion-scale networks currently prevalent in reality that often
possess highly skewed degree distributions, the square root of
the maximum degree
√
dmax is generally very large, although the
average degree d¯ can be small. Thus, we expect that the maxi-
mum eigenvalue λ(A) tends to be very large, so is the required
δ/β ≥ λ(A). Since applying the massive patches to nodes on a
large-scale network is often infeasible in practice as shall be ex-
plained shortly, achieving the below-the-threshold condition by
increasing δ (possibly δi ) and lowering λ(A) by removing a few
nodes and/or edges can hardly be practical. In addition, we note
that the immediate availability of the curing process (possibly with
very high curing rate) makes the SIS/SIR models over-simplified
and far from the reality, since any infected devices remain infected
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Figure 1: (a) The dynamics of an SIS epidemic over an Erdős-Rényi
graph; (b) Illustrating the epidemic evolution before and after the
window of vulnerability.
at least over the early times or possibly over a longer time span, de-
pending on when the patches or workarounds for the underlying
epidemic become available.
As an example, consider an Erdős-Rényi graph with n = 2000
and λ(A)= 16.159, which is the same simulation setting as in [57].
We present two simulation results on the evolution of an SIS epi-
demic for below and above the threshold in Figure 1(a). For the SIS
epidemic, we fix β = 0.06, and use δ = 1 for below the threshold
and δ = 0.8 for above the threshold. As the initial condition, 1000
initially infected nodes are randomly selected. While Figure 1(a)
confirms that the epidemic dies out quickly for the former and a
non-zero fraction of infected nodes remain in any observable time
for the latter, we note that the extinction of the epidemic requires
the curing rateδ to be at least λ(A)≈16 times greater than the infec-
tion rate β in this simulation, i.e., the infection itself is weaker than
the autonomous self-recovery by λ(A) ≈ 16 times, which seems to
be either too idealistic or practically infeasible in reality.
3.2 The Gap between Theory and Practice
There is a huge gap between theory and practice. First, the patches
and workarounds are not immediately available. There is often a
non-negligible amount of time required for a patch or vaccine to be
available when a vulnerability or its exploit becomes disclosed. In
particular, when zero-day vulnerabilities are exploited, the attacks
are rarely discovered right away. More often than not, there is an
undisclosed vulnerability that may have been already exploited,
but its patch is not available or the exploit even remains unknown
to developers and engineers. Thewindow of vulnerability between
the time a threat is discovered and the time a security patch is re-
leased can take not just days but weeks or months and sometimes
years [18, 48]. Therefore, the early times for the malware/worm
attacks are the non-negligible critical timescales for which the SI
model is most suitable than any other models armed with the cur-
ing process, as illustrated in Figure 1(b)5, but little is known for the
transient dynamics of the SI model.
Second, patching end hosts often comes at a significant cost.
Take applying patches to IoT devices as an example. The IoT de-
vices generally adopt low-power wireless technologies supporting
very low data rates as compared toWiFi and cellular networks [41].
5Figure 1(b) also represents two possible dynamics after the window of vulnerability.
One is the extinction of the underlying epidemic with massive patching, and the other
is the presence of a non-negligible number of infected nodes, which happens when
massive patching is practically not possible.
They are also often deployed with duty-cycle constraints (the max-
imum duty cycle is typically 1% or 0.1%) [1, 16, 60], which means
that the devices are not connected to the network all the time. The
low bandwidth is thus common in most IoT networks. In addi-
tion, sending a technician to patch manually is not possible due
to the huge number of devices that need to be patched and be-
cause they may be located in harsh environments [30], making it
difficult to directly access the devices and thus rendering the over-
the-air updates the only viable solution. Considering the low band-
width of the IoT networks, distributing patches, once available, to
IoT devices over the air becomes a daunting, high-cost task both
in time and bandwidth required. Thus, achieving the ‘below-the-
threshold’ for the extinction of an epidemic is deemed practically
impossible over a wide range of timescales, since the difficulties
of distributing patches tend to make the long-term recovery rate
δ small and thus the effective infection rate β/δ above the thresh-
old. In this above-the-threshold regime, the node infection is more
dominant than its recovery and the corresponding epidemic dy-
namics can be more or less captured by the largely-overlooked SI
model, which is in contrast to the existing literature that typically
strives to achieve the complete extinction of an epidemic. There-
fore, we would have to seek to alleviate the epidemic spreading to
the maximum extent possible under the patching-cost constraints
via the marginalized SI model, or the SIS/SIR models in the above-
the-threshold regime.
4 REVISITING THE SI MODEL ON A GRAPH
We have observed that the SI model is most relevant in early times
when patches are not available, or over a wider range of timescales
when massive patching is practically infeasible. We first note that
in contrast to the SIS/SIR models, the only fixed point (steady state)
of this SI dynamics is x(∞) = 1 as long as x(t0) , 0, and thus it
becomes necessary (and non-trivial) to understand the transient
dynamics of x(t) for all t , not just the fixed point x(∞). Unfortu-
nately, there is not much known about the SI model, as opposed to
the abundant literature on the SIS/SIR models that is mostly based
on the stability/steady-state analysis regarding x(∞).
By setting δ =0 in (1), we write again the dynamical system for
the standard SI model as follows. For any node i ∈ N ,
dxi (t)
dt
= β(1 − xi (t))
∑
j∈N
ai jxj (t), t ≥ t0, (2)
with an initial condition x(t0). To avoid the triviality, we exclude
the trivial cases x(t0)=0 and x(t0)=1 throughout the paper.6 Thus,
there is at least one node i having strictly positive probability of
being infected at time t0, i.e., xi (t0)> 0 for some i . Note that xi (t)
is non-decreasing in time t ≥ t0 as the RHS of (2) is non-negative
for all t , for all i , i.e., x(t1)  x(t2) for t1 ≤ t2.
The nonlinear dynamical system of the SI model in (2), albeit its
simple form, is generally not solvable in a closed form. Lineariza-
tion has thus been used in the literature explicitly or implicitly as
an approximation for the SI model [5, 40, 45]. It is essentially to use
a linear dynamical system that upper-bounds the original nonlin-
ear dynamical system in (2) as follows. For any i ∈ N and for any
6If x(t0)=0, every node is healthy at time t0 with probability 1 and thus they remain
healthy forever. Similarly, if x(t0)=1, every one is already infected at time t0 .
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time t ≥ t0,
dxi (t)
dt
= β(1 − xi (t))
∑
j∈N
ai jxj (t) ≤ β
∑
j∈N
ai jxj (t) (3)
from 1 − xi (t) ≤ 1. Let x˜(t) , [x˜1(t), x˜2(t), . . . , x˜n (t)]T be the
solution of the following linear dynamics, which is available in a
closed form. For any t ≥ t0,
dx˜i (t)
dt
= β
∑
j∈N
ai j x˜j (t), or d x˜(t)
dt
= βAx˜(t).
It thus follows from (3) that
x(t)  x˜(t) = eβ (t−t0)Ax(t0), t ≥ t0, (4)
given that x˜(t0) = x(t0). To the best of our knowledge, it is the only
mathematical technique available in the literature for tractable
analysis of the SI model. Note that the linearization has also been
used for other epidemic models that have nonlinear system dy-
namics [7, 45, 52, 53, 63].
x˜(t) can also be expressed in terms of the eigenvalues and eigen-
vectors of A. First, the spectral decomposition of the symmetric
matrix A yields A =
∑n
k=1
λkvkv
T
k
, where λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ · · · ≥ λn are
the real eigenvalues of A, and vi are orthonormal eigenvectors of
A with vTi vi = 1 for any i , and v
T
i vj = 0 for i , j [42]. Then, by
representing eAt as a power series, we have
eAt = I + tA +
t2
2!
A2 +
t3
3!
A3 + · · ·
=
n∑
k=1
vkv
T
k
+ t
n∑
k=1
λkvkv
T
k
+
t2
2!
n∑
k=1
λ2
k
vkv
T
k
+ · · · ,
=
n∑
k=1
vk
(
1 + tλk +
(tλk )2
2!
+ · · ·
)
vT
k
=
n∑
k=1
eλk tvkv
T
k
,
where we have used the identity I =
∑n
k=1
vkv
T
k
and the orthonor-
mality of vi . Furthermore, since the non-negative matrix A is irre-
ducible and aperiodic, by Perron-Frobenius theorem [42], λ1=λ(A)
is positive with λ1> |λk | (k,1) and its corresponding eigenvector
v1 has all positive components, i.e., v1≻0. Therefore, from (4), we
have, for any t ≥ t0,
x˜(t) = eβ (t−t0)Ax(t0) =
n∑
k=1
ξke
βλk (t−t0)vk
= eβλ1(t−t0)
(
ξ1v1 +
n∑
k=2
ξke
−β (λ1−λk )(t−t0)vk
)
, (5)
= ξ1e
βλ1(t−t0)v1
(
1 +O
(
e−mink≥2 |λ1−λk |(t−t0)
))
, (6)
where ξk , v
T
k
x(t0) ∈ R for each k . By noting that λ1 > 0, v1 ≻ 0,
and ξ1 =v
T
1 x(t0)> 0, (6) follows from that all the summands in (5)
decay exponentially fast in time t , since λ1−λk > 0 for k ≥ 2. The
leading eigenvector v1 is widely known as the eigenvector central-
ity (EVC) [5, 6, 39, 45], of which i-th element represents the no-
tion of importance (centrality) of node i . Thus, it has been argued
that the EVC captures the initial growth rate of the SI epidemic dy-
namics, or the probability of node i being infected, over early time
t [5, 6, 40, 45].
However, we observe that there are the following critical limi-
tations with the ‘linearization bound’ in (4).
1. The linearization bound x˜(t) in (4) and its approximation via
v1 in (6) quickly grow without bound, having x˜i (∞)=∞ for all
i . By definition, it must be x(t)  1 for all t .
2. x˜(t) is an accurate approximate solution to the original SI dy-
namics in (2) only for small time t and only when x(t0) ≈ 0.
3. The approximation of x˜(t) via the EVC v1 is only effective
for large time t in which regime x˜(t) already becomes invalid,
rendering x˜i (t) ≫ 1, although the EVC has been mistakenly
known to capture the early infection dynamics.
The first limitation is apparent because the dominant term in (6)
grows exponentially fast in t , and the second one can be seen from
that x(t0) ≈ 0 implies 1−xi (t) ≈ 1 for all i and thusmakes the upper
bound tight in (3) only over early t near t0.
7 The third limitation
follows from that the approximation via the EVC v1 in (6) is close
to x˜(t) only when time t is sufficiently large enough.
Therefore, the conventional use of the EVC [5, 6, 39, 45] to char-
acterize the SI epidemic dynamics and its applications to identify
critical nodes for vaccine allocation become largely questionable.
This also calls for a more precise approximate solution of (2) that
works for any arbitrary x(t0) over a longer period of time t , which
will lead tomore effective policies for combating the epidemics and
providing vaccine distribution.
5 UNDERSTANDING THE TRANSIENT
DYNAMICS OF SI EPIDEMIC SPREADING
Having observed the limitations of the conventional linearized
ODE approach to the SI model, we set out to develop a simple yet
effective technique to obtain a closed-form approximate solution
to the original SI dynamics in (2). In contrast to the conventional
one, our solution is valid and remains effective for any initial con-
dition x(t0) and for all time t . In particular, ours is much tighter
than the conventional one, as shall be demonstrated below. Our
technique is based upon a novel transformation converting the
dynamical system in (2) into an equivalent system with a suitable
substitution. This transformation allows us to obtain the closed-
form approximate solution and, in turn, to better characterize the
transient dynamics of the original SI epidemic spreading process.
In addition, we newly uncover an equivalent interpretation of the
SI dynamics from a reliability theory standpoint and explain its
connection to our transformation. This also reveals the stochas-
tic properties of how long each node i would survive as time t
increases, thanks to the interpretation and transformation.
5.1 Transformation Method and Tight Bound
Our key observation is to set
yi (t) , д(xi (t)) = − log(1 − xi (t)) ∈ [0,∞], (7)
7The most likely scenario ensuring x(t0) ≈ 0 would be that the fraction of the initial
infective nodes to the graph size n is small but there is no knowledge on the exact ini-
tial infectives. For example, a small number c of nodes, which are chosen uniformly at
random, are initially infected, i.e., xi (t0)=c/n for all i , when n is large [45]. However,
x(t0) ≈ 0 is no longer valid as long as the knowledge on the exact initial infectives
is available. For instance, if a specific node, say i∗, is infected at t0 and its identity is
known, then xi∗ (t0)=1 and xi (t0)=0 for all other nodes i , making x(t0)≈0 invalid.
That is, x(t0)≈0 does not always hold even when there are few infected nodes at t0 .
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where д(x) , − log(1−x) is an increasing convex function in x ∈
[0, 1]. Equivalently, we have
xi (t) , f (yi (t)) = 1 − e−yi (t ) ∈ [0, 1], (8)
where f (y) , 1−e−y = д−1(y) is the inverse of д, and increasing
concave in y≥ 0. Thus, (2) can be written as
dyi (t)
dt
= β
∑
j∈N
ai j f (yj (t)), t ≥ t0, (9)
with y(t0)=д(x(t0)). By applying the ‘inverse’ substitution with f ,
we can recover the original vector x(t)= f (y(t)) at time t . Note that
in addition to the aforementionedmonotonicity property over time
t , i.e., x(t1)  x(t2) for any t1 ≤ t2, we can see that there is another
monotonicity over ordered initial conditions. Letting x(t) be the
solution of (2) with a different initial condition x(t0), if x(t0) 
x(t0), then x(t)  x(t) for all t ≥ t0. This can be easily seen from
that y(t)=д(x(t)) is a monotonic transformation of x(t) (and vice
versa), and the RHS of (9) is non-decreasing in yi (t) for all t ≥ t0.
It is worth noting that this property is not entirely obvious in the
view of (2) but becomes apparent through our transformation.
Similar to the original dynamics in (2), unfortunately, its trans-
formed dynamics in (9) is still nonlinear and is generally not solv-
able in a closed form.Whilewe are inevitably led to derive an upper
bound of the (unknown) solution of (2), it effectively overcomes
the limitations of the conventional one in (4) and remains valid for
any initial conditions x(t0) and for all t ≥ t0. We below show this
upper bound.
For a given x(t0), let xˆ(t), [xˆ1(t), xˆ2(t), . . . , xˆn (t)]T be our ap-
proximate solution to (2), which is given by xˆ(t) = f (yˆ(t)), where
yˆ(t) is the solution of the following nonhomogeneous linear sys-
tem and yˆ(t0)=д(x(t0)): For any t ≥ t0,
d yˆ(t)
dt
= βA diag(1−x(t0))yˆ(t) + βAb(x(t0)), (10)
where b(x) , x + (1 − x) log(1 − x) is increasing from b(0) = 0 to
b(1) = 1. We have the following.
Theorem 5.1. For any t ≥ t0, we have
x(t)  xˆ(t) = f (yˆ(t))  x˜(t), (11)
when they have the same initial conditions, i.e., x(t0) = xˆ(t0) = x˜(t0),
where yˆ(t) is given by
yˆ(t) = eβ (t−t0)A diag(1−x(t0))д(x(t0))
+
∞∑
k=0
(β(t−t0))k+1
(k+1)! [A diag(1 − x(t0))]
k Ab(x(t0)), (12)
and x˜(t) is given by (4). In addition, ‖xˆ(t) − x(t)‖ tends to zero while
‖x˜(t) − x(t)‖ tends to infinity, as time t goes to infinity.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Remark 1. Theorem 5.1 shows that our upper bound xˆ(t)= f (yˆ(t))
is provided as a function of yˆ(t) whose closed-form expression is
given by (12) with the initial condition yˆ(t0)=д(x(t0)). The diago-
nal matrix diag(1−x(t0)) has diagonal elements 1−xi (t0). Similarly,
b(x(t0)) has entries xi (t0)+(1−xi (t0)) log(1−xi (t0)). Therefore, with
a given snapshot x(t0) at t0 and given β ,A, one can readily evalu-
ate xˆ(t) for t ≥ t0, where the power-series term can be evaluated
by taking a truncation of the series.8 In addition, as shown in (11)
in Theorem 5.1, our bound xˆ(t) is tighter than the traditional lin-
earization bound x˜(t) for all time t . In particular, xˆ(t)works for any
choice of x(t0) and remains valid as a probability for all t (since
xˆi (t) = f (yˆi (t)) ∈ [0, 1] for all t ), in contrast to the linearization
bound x˜(t) that grows exponentially fast without bound.
The overall procedure of our transformation method to obtain
xˆ(t) as an accurate approximation to x(t) can be summarized in the
following steps: 1) transform x(t) to y(t), 2) bound y(t) by yˆ(t), and
3) inversely transform yˆ(t) back to xˆ(t). See the details in the proof
of Theorem 5.1. The whole procedure is non-trivial and more sys-
tematic as compared to the traditional, naive linearization method
of obtaining x˜(t). We also note that the closed-form expression of
yˆ(t) in (12) can be simplified to the following.
Corollary 5.2. Let t0=0. If x(0) ≺ 1, (12) reduces to
yˆ(t) = д(x(0)) +
[
eβtA diag(1−x(0)) − I
]
diag(1−x(0))−1x(0). (13)
If xi (0) ∈ {0, 1} for all i , (12) reduces to
yˆ(t) = д(x(0)) +
∞∑
k=0
(βt)k+1
(k+1)! [A diag(1−x(0))]
k Ax(0) (14)
Proof. See Appendix B. 
Corollary 5.2 says that when 0 ≤ xi (0) < 1 for all i , (12) can be
simplified to (13), which is essentially from the fact that diag(1−
x(0)) is invertible. Similarly, when xi (0) = 0 or xi (0) = 1 for all i ,
we have diag(1−x(0))д(x(0)) = 0 and b(x(0)) = x(0), from which
(12) reduces to (14). See the proof of Corollary 5.2 for more details.
Note that for the other cases of x(0), (12) can still be evaluated.
In addition, if 0≤xi (0)< 1 for all i , (13) can be further simplified
as was done for x˜(t) in (6) through the spectral decomposition ofA
and the power series of eAt . Let µ1, µ2, . . . , µn be the eigenvalues
of A diag(1 − x(0)), with µ1=λ(Adiag(1 − x(0))). Let uˆ1 and vˆ1 be
the left and right eigenvectors corresponding to µ1, normalized so
that uˆT1 vˆ1=1, respectively. We here assume that A diag(1−x(0)) is
diagonalizable. Note that A is irreducible and aperiodic, and so is
A diag(1−x(0)). Then, we have the following.
Corollary 5.3. Let t0=0. If x(0) ≺ 1, we have
yˆ(t) = ξˆ1eβµ1t vˆ1
(
1 +O
(
e−mink≥2 |µ1−Re(µk ) |t
))
− diag(1 − x(0))−1x(0) + д(x(0)), (15)
where ξˆ1, uˆ
T
1 diag(1−x(0))−1x(0)> 0, and µ1 is real and positive.
Proof. See Appendix C. 
As can be seen from (15), the growth rate of yˆ(t) for large time t
is mainly governed by the leading right eigenvector vˆ1, which has a
natural interpretation as the EVC of aweighted, directed graphwith
its weight matrixW,A diag(1−x(0)), wherewi j =ai j (1−xj (0)) for
all i, j. Note that ai j = 1 should be read as a ‘directed’ edge from j
to i , as can be seen from (1) and (2). Despite the simplification and
8We can show that ‖[A diag(1−x(0))]kAx(0) ‖ / [λ(A diag(1−x(0)))]k λ(A) ‖x(0) ‖,
where λ(A diag(1−x(0))) and λ(A) are the spectral radiuses ofA diag(1−x(0)) andA,
respectively. By Stirling’s approximation, k !∼
√
2πk (k/e )k , for given β, t , the k-th
summand decays fast in k . The decaying speed is even faster for early t .
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Figure 2: The expected number of infected nodes
∑
i xi (t ) (Simu-
lation) obtained through the SI simulations and its upper bounds∑
i x˜i (t ) (Linearization) and
∑
i xˆi (t ) (Transformation) over time t .
the natural interpretation, the dominant term involving the EVC
ofW in (15) alone may not be enough to accurately capture the SI
epidemic dynamics, especially when the relevant timescale for the
SI dynamics is the early time t .
We again emphasize that our bound xˆ(t) (without the simplifi-
cation) is valid for all time t and effectively overcomes the limita-
tions of the linearization bound x˜(t) in Section 4, as shown in Theo-
rem 5.1. To numerically demonstrate the effectiveness of our bound
xˆ(t), in Figure 2, we provide the expected number of infected nodes∑
i xi (t)=E {
∑
i Xi (t)} obtained through the SI simulations, and its
bounds
∑
i x˜i (t) (traditional bound) and
∑
i xˆi (t) (our bound) over
time t . Figure 2 clearly demonstrates how quickly x˜(t) becomes in-
valid, not to mention the huge gap between x˜(t) and x(t), and con-
firms the superiority of xˆ(t) over x˜(t) to better approximate x(t)
for all t . For Figure 2, we use the Gnutella P2P network dataset in
the SNAP repository [35]. Specifically, we use its largest strongly
connected component (undirected version) with 3,234 nodes and
13,453 edges to ensure the connectivity. A fixed node is initially in-
fected at time 0. Our bound xˆ(t) is computed based on the numer-
ical evaluation of yˆ(t) in (14) by taking a truncation of the series.
5.2 A New Look of the SI Model from
Reliability Theory
We turn our attention to a novel interpretation of the SI epidemic
dynamics from reliability theory, and its connection to our trans-
formation method and associated properties.
Without loss of generality, we set t0 = 0. Let Ti , min{t ≥ 0 :
Xi (t) = 1} be the time until node i gets infected. While Ti is a
non-negative random variable, we allow that the event {Ti = 0} ≡
{Xi (0)= 1} is possible with non-zero probability xi (0)=P{Xi(0)=
1}> 0. We first observe the identity that
xi (t) = E{Xi (t)} = P{Xi (t) = 1} = P{Ti ≤ t}, i ∈ N . (16)
Letting fTi (t) be the probability density function of Ti , we have
dxi (t)/dt = fTi (t) for all i . We also define by hi (t) the failure (or
hazard) rate function [34, 56]
hi (t) ,
fTi (t)
P{Ti > t} =
d
dt
P{Ti ≤ t}
P{Ti > t} , i ∈ N . (17)
It is easy to see that with probability hi (t)dt , node i becomes in-
fected in the interval (t , t+dt) given that it has survived for time t .
We then have the following.
Lemma 5.4. The time-to-infection distribution is given by
P{Ti > t} = P{Ti > 0} exp
{
−
∫ t
0
hi (s)ds
}
, (18)
with the failure rate function hi (t) given by
hi (t) = β
∑
j∈N
ai jxj (t) = β
∑
j∈N
ai jP{Tj ≤ t}, i ∈ N . (19)
Proof. Using the identity in (16) and
dxi (t )
dt
= fTi (t), we observe
that (2) can be written as fTi (t) = P{Ti > t}β
∑
j∈N ai jP{Tj ≤ t},
which implies
hi (t) =
fTi (t)
P{Ti > t} = β
∑
j∈N
ai jP{Tj ≤ t}.
After integrating both sides of the first equality and exponentiating
the both sides, we have P{Ti > t} = C exp
{
−
∫ t
0
hi (s)ds
}
. Letting
t =0 yields C=P{Ti > 0}, and thus we have (18). 
It is worth noting that the exponential term in the RHS of (18) is
the usual form of the survival function, P{Ti > t}, in terms of the
failure rate function in the reliability theory, which assumes that
the probability of surviving past time 0 is 1 [34, 56]. Such an as-
sumption is relaxed here to capture the possibility that some nodes
are already infected at time 0, and thus the term P{Ti > 0} appears
in the RHS of (18).
Lemma 5.4 shows that the failure rate function hi (t) uniquely
determines the distribution P{Ti > t}. This is generally true for
any continuous random variables [34, 56]. Furthermore, by the con-
struction of our transformation in (7)–(9) and from (16), we see that
for any i ∈ N ,
yi (t) = − log(1 − xi (t)) = − log (P{Ti > 0}) +
∫ t
0
hi (s)ds, (20)
implying that
dyi (t )
dt
=hi (t). Thus, considering the relationship be-
tween xi (t) and P{Ti > t} in (16), one can observe that the struc-
ture of the one-to-one correspondence between xi (t) and yi (t) is
identical to the one between the failure rate function hi (t) and the
distribution P{Ti > t}.
In addition, let Ti,t be the residual life at time t whose distribu-
tion is given by
P{Ti,t > t ′} = P{Ti > t + t ′ |Ti > t} = exp
{
−
∫ t+t ′
t
hi (s)ds
}
, (21)
from Lemma 5.4. We then have the following.
Lemma 5.5. Ti,t is stochastically decreasing (non-increasing) in
t ≥ 0 for each i .
Proof. Fix i . From (12), we see that yi (t) is non-decreasing in
t . Since f (y) is monotone increasing in y ≥ 0, this implies that the
RHS of (9) is non-decreasing, and so is
dyi (t )
dt
. The identity
dyi (t )
dt
=
hi (t) implies that hi (t) is also non-decreasing in t . Thus, the asser-
tion follows by noting the identity of P{Ti,t > t ′} in (21). 
This means that the older node i survives without being in-
fected, the stochastically smaller its residual life to infection.
7
6 COMBATING SI EPIDEMIC SPREADING
WITH LIMITED RESOURCES
As noted in Section 3.2, there is a non-trivial technical challenge
for combating epidemic spreading due to the limited resources –
both time and bandwidth required. It naturally translates into how
to prioritize nodes for patching and vaccination under resource-
constrained environments. We can broadly classify vaccination
strategies into two categories based on the target scenarios. The
first one is for proactive or preventive vaccination. In this case, no
one has been infected by t0. No one would know which kind of
malware/worm attack would be a threat later on, but one can put
forth an effort to proactively make the networking system more
robust, for example, by utilizing the diversification of operating
systems and software versions across nodes [22, 44]. In most rel-
evant scenarios, due to limited resources, we are often asked to
prioritize which nodes to be treated or patched first. This boils
down to the problem of choosing a limited set of nodes for early
treatment tomaximize the return on spending limited resources, or
equivalently, to minimize the potential impact from any possible
epidemic outbreak in the future.
The second category is for reactive vaccination. In this case, the
spread of an epidemic already took place over the large-scale net-
work. Assuming that the knowledge of such an on-going epidemic
is available and can be estimated, the problem is how to mitigate
the epidemic spreading to the extent possible with any resources
available by t0, which may be lately available patches or just in-
complete workaround, e.g., changing the operating system. It be-
comes particularly important under cost-constrained networking
environments, where immediate post-treatment/-patching for vul-
nerable (not-yet-infected) nodes is not possible. For example, the
networkmay consist of many battery-constrained and/or resource-
limited devices that frequently need to go into a dormant state, as
would be the case in future large-scale IoT networks. It again boils
down to the problem of choosing a limited set of nodes for such re-
active vaccination so as to minimize the damage from the epidemic
spread, now with a possible knowledge of highly contagious area
or the estimated source of infection.
Let K be a given number of patches/vaccines to immunize K
nodes over G. We are interested in designing vaccination policies
to find which set of nodes need to be vaccinated out of N for the
K patches/vaccines in both preventively and reactively. The differ-
ence is that in the former, the source of a (future) epidemic out-
break can potentially be any node, i.e., xi (t0)=c/n, while the latter
has a specific source of the epidemic outbreak, i.e., xi (t0) = 1 for
some i . We first note that from the monotonicity property x(t1) 
x(t2) for t1 ≤ t2, the likelihood or probability xi (t) of node i being
infected increases in t . Lemma 5.5 also says that the remaining life-
time (time till infection) of susceptible (not-yet-infected) node i at
time t is stochastically decreasing in t . In other words, this node is
more likely to be infected as time goes on, if not ‘treated’ (or vacci-
nated) now. Thus, in order to maximally suppress down the (early)
growth rate of the SI dynamics out of K vaccines, a rule of thumb
would be to find the most likely K nodes who would become first
infected and to immunize these K nodes.
If x(t) is available in a closed form, we would evaluate x(t) for
early time t , sort xi (t), i = 1, 2, . . . ,n, in a descending order, and
then choose the top K nodes for vaccination. While x(t) is gen-
erally not known in a closed form, thanks to Theorem 5.1, we are
here able to leverage the closed-form expression xˆ(t)= f (yˆ(t))with
yˆ(t) in (12). That is, our vaccination policy is to sort xˆi (t), or equiv-
alently yˆi (t) (since f (y) is monotone increasing in y), i=1, 2, . . . ,n,
in a decreasing order and to choose the corresponding topK nodes
for vaccine distribution. Since the prediction xˆ(t) for t ≥ t0 via (12)
evolves from our initial ‘knowledge’ xˆ(t0)= x(t0), our vaccine dis-
tribution strategies largely depend on the type of the initial knowl-
edge and are categorized into the following preventive and reactive
vaccination policies.
Preventive Vaccination:We set t0=0 for ease of explanation. In
this scenario, xi (0) = c/n, i = 1, 2, . . . ,n, for some c . We define a
constant α , 1−c/n for notational simplicity. By noticing diag(1−
x(0))=αI, from Corollary 5.2, we have
yˆ(t) = (1/α − 1)eα βtA1 − (1/α − 1 + log(α)) 1, (22)
where eα βtA can be written as
eα βtA = I + αβtA +
(αβt)2
2!
A2 + · · · (23)
Since [Ak ]i j gives the number of walks of length k that connect
nodes i and j, [eα βtA]i j indicates the weighted sum of walks con-
necting nodes i and j, where the number of length-k walks is dis-
counted by the weight (αβt)k/k!, putting relatively larger weights
on shorter walks than longer ones. In other words, [eα βtA]i j re-
flects how ‘easy’ node j can propagate a virus over G to infect node
i , and vice versa due to the symmetry of eα βtA. Thus, if node i has
a higher weighted sum of walks from every node to itself than that
of node j at time t , i.e.,
[eα βtA1]i =
∑
l
[eα βtA]il ≥
∑
l
[eα βtA]jl = [eα βtA1]j ,
then node i has a higher chance of being infected at t than node j.
That is, node i has many relatively smaller paths of being infected
from others at t . In addition, since eα βtA1 is the only dominant fac-
tor and is irrespective of x(0) = (c/n)1, this preventive vaccination
is source-independent/agonistic.
It is worth noting that the (i, j) entry [eA]i j of the matrix expo-
nential eA has been proposed in the statistical physics as a measure
of the “communicability" [15] between nodes i and j over G, which
is a generalization of the shortest path. In this view, we can sim-
ilarly interpret [eα βtA]i j in (23) as a measure of the “infectivity"
from j to i at time t when x(0) = (c/n)1.
Reactive Vaccination:We next move on to the scenario that the
knowledge of the initial sources for the currently prevalent epi-
demic spreading is available. That is, lettingI , {i ∈N : xi (0)=1},
we have the knowledge of I at time 0.
We first start with the case that xi (0) = 0 for i ∈ S , N \ I,
i.e., we know whether or not each node is infected at t0 = 0. The
corresponding expression of yˆ(t) is given by (14) in Corollary 5.2.
We see that д(xi (0)) = ∞ for all i ∈ I and д(xi (0)) = 0 for all i ∈ S,
which indicates the first term in the RHS of (14) is merely an indica-
tor of the sources. Thus, the second term in the RHS of (14) mainly
decides the value of yˆi (t) for i ∈ S. Here, [(A diag(1−x(0)))k ]i j
counts the number of k-length walks from j to i over G, but with
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Figure 3: Preventive scenario. The expected number of infected
nodes as time t increases, using our preventive policy, EVC-based
policy, and degree-based policy with different amounts of vaccines.
removal of the (directed) edges emanating from the sources, which
can be seen from that [A diag(1−x(0))]i j = 0 for all j ∈ I. Further-
more, [Ax(0)]l ≥ 1 for all direct (one-hop) neighbors l of I, while
[Ax(0)]l = 0 for all the other nodes. Therefore, yˆi (t), i ∈ S, is still
governed by the weighted sum of walks from all direct (one-hop)
neighbors l ofI to i , albeit over the ‘altered’ graph, where the num-
ber of length-k walks from l to i is penalized by slightly different
weights (βt)k+1/(k+1)! but also scaled by [Ax(0)]l . In contrast to
the preventive case, yˆ(t) clearly depends on the network structure
A as well as the source information x(0), which makes our reactive
vaccination ‘source-aware’.
The other case of xi (0) > 0 for some i ∈ S reflects the situation
that in addition to I, there are other nodes that are suspected to
be already infected, although uncertain. The knowledge of I it-
self can also be incomplete, possibly with rough estimates on x(0).
Nonetheless, in any case, we can leverage the closed-form expres-
sion of yˆ(t) in (12) with t0 = 0. While we can obtain similar inter-
pretations on yˆ(t) as earlier, we omit them for brevity.
7 SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present simulation results to demonstrate the
efficacy of our proposed vaccination policies for both preventive
and reactive scenarios. To this end, we consider two real-world net-
work datasets. One is the Gnutella P2P graph [35], whose largest
connected component (undirected version) with 3,234 nodes and
13,453 edges is used to ensure the connectivity. The other is the
Oregon AS router graph of 2,504 nodes and 4,723 edges [8]. We set
the infection rate β = 0.05. Each data point reported is obtained
by averaging over 104 independent simulations. Due to space con-
straint, we here present representative simulation results.
We compare the performance of our vaccination policies against
the EVC-based and degree-based policies. The former is the vacci-
nation policy inspired by the conventional wisdom that the EVC
can capture the early growth rate of the SI dynamics, which helps
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Figure 4: Reactive scenario. The expected number of infected nodes
over time t using our reactive policy, EVC-based policy, and degree-
based policy with varying amounts of vaccines.
identify the critical nodes (or the most vulnerable nodes) for vac-
cine distribution [5, 6, 39, 45]. That is, this policy is to choose the
top K EVC nodes for immunization. The other policy is based on
the node degree. From the graph connectivity, high-degree nodes
have a high chance of being exposed to the spread of an epidemic
and thus this policy is to choose the top K degree nodes for vacci-
nation. In all the policies, the selected nodes are fully immunized
as if they are removed from the graph.
Figure 3 shows the expected number of infected nodes obtained
over the Gnutella P2P and Oregon AS graphs for the preventive
case, where an epidemic starts from a randomly chosen node, with
different choices of K . In all cases, the EVC-based policy turns out
to be the worst, which is in stark contrast to the conventional wis-
dom (built on top of the SI dynamics) that the node with high EVC
value is considered to play a dominant role in spreading the infec-
tion over early time t . The unsatisfactory performance of the EVC-
based policy is attributed to the third limitation of the linearization
bound x˜(t) mentioned in Section 4. That is, the approximation of
x˜(t) via the EVC is only effective for large time t in which regime
x˜(t) already becomes invalid, i.e., x˜i (t) ≫ 1, and thus the EVC is
not the right metric to capture the early infection dynamics.
On the other hand, our preventive policy and the degree-based
policy lead to similar results, both of which are better than the
EVC-based one. This is in line with our explanation under the no-
tion of “infectivity", implying that a node with many short-length
walks of being connected from all other nodes is more likely to
be selected in our preventive policy. Intuitively, high-degree nodes
have a high chance of being connected tomore one-hop or few-hop
neighbors, and our preventive policy also gives higher weights to
higher-degree nodes. To be precise, we note that the top K nodes
under our preventive policy are purely determined by eα βtA1, as
mentioned in Section 6, and eα βtA1 ≈ 1 + αβtA1 for small t , as
can be seen from (23). We also see that A1 is the vector of node de-
grees. Thus, they result in similar performance. It is worth noting
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that not all high-degree nodes have high EVC values, especially for
those who are connected to low-degree nodes.
When it comes to the reactive scenario, our source-aware pol-
icy performs better than the other policies, as shown in Figure 4,
where a node with 22 neighbors is chosen to be the initial infec-
tive source for Gnutella P2P graph and a node with 68 neighbors
is chosen for Oregon AS graph. Our policy clearly demonstrates
the benefit of exploiting both the graph topology A and the cur-
rently available knowledge x(t0), with limited resources available,
i.e., K =15, 18 for the Gnutella P2P graph andK =30, 50 for the Ore-
gon AS graph.We also observe that the performance improvement
under the Oregon AS graph is more drastic. One possible reason
is the structural difference between the graphs. The Gnutella P2P
graph is a well-connected, random-like graph, while the Oregon
AS graph has a highly skewed degree distribution. Our reactive
policy, when combined with such a highly-skewed graph structure,
can effectively fragment the graph by vaccinating only few nodes
with the knowledge of x(t0), leaving a large portion of the graph
no longer infected.
8 CONCLUSION
We have developed a theoretical framework to provide an accurate
approximate solution to the standard SI epidemic model, which
captures the temporal behavior of the SI dynamics over all time and
is tighter than the existing linearized approximation. We also give
a reliability-theory interpretation of the SI dynamics, which yields
stochastic characterization of the residual life of each node until
infection. The theoretical framework further enabled us to develop
vaccination policies for both preventive and reactive mitigation of
epidemic outbreaks. We believe that our work provides a first step
toward the correct understanding of the transient dynamics of the
SI epidemic spreading process, and also sheds light on the design of
vaccination strategies to prioritize devices for vaccine distribution
under resource-constrained environments.
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A PROOF OF THEOREM 5.1
We set x(t0) = xˆ(t0) = x˜(t0). To show (11), we first prove that
x(t)  xˆ(t) = f (yˆ(t)), t ≥ t0, (24)
and yˆ(t) is given by (12). Observe that y(t) = д(x(t)) and yˆ(t) =
д(xˆ(t)) aremonotonic transformations of x(t) and xˆ(t), respectively.
It is thus enough to show that y(t)  yˆ(t) when y(t0)= yˆ(t0). Con-
sidering the concavity of f (y) and the tangent line of f (y) aty = y0,
we have
f (y) ≤ f (y0) + f ′(y0)(y − y0) = f ′(y0)y + f (y0) − f ′(y0)y0,
for y ≥ y0 ≥ 0, where f ′(y) = e−y is the derivative of f (y). We
also see that yi (t) is non-decreasing in t ≥ t0 with yi (t0) ≥ 0 from
the non-negativity of the RHS of (9). Thus, we have
dyi (t)
dt
= β
∑
j∈N
ai j f (yj (t))
≤ β
∑
j∈N
ai j
[
f ′(yj (t0))yj (t)+ f (yj (t0))− f ′(yj (t0))yj (t0)
]
= β
∑
j∈N
ai j (1 − xj (t0))yj (t) + β
∑
j∈N
ai jb(xj (t0)), (25)
for t ≥ t0. The last equality follows from the identities f ′(yj (t0)) =
e−yj (t0) = 1 − xj (t0), and
f (yj (t0)) − f ′(yj (t0))yj (t0) = 1 − e−yj (t0)(yj (t0) + 1)
= xj (t0) + (1−xj (t0)) log(1−xj (t0))
= b(xj (t0)),
from yi (t0) = − log(1−xi (t0)) and b(x) = x + (1−x) log(1−x). Then,
we note that the RHS of (25) withyj (t) replaced by yˆj (t) in a matrix
form is identical to the RHS of (10). Using the method of variation
of parameters [3], the solution yˆ(t) of (10) is given by
yˆ(t) = eβ (t−t0)A diag(1−x(t0))д(x(t0))
+
∫ t
t0
βeβ (t−s)A diag(1−x(t0))Ab(x(t0))ds, t ≥ t0. (26)
By using the identity
eβsA diag(1−x(t0)) =
∞∑
k=0
(βs)k
k!
[A diag(1−x(t0))]k ,
the second term in the RHS of (26) can be written as∫ t
t0
βeβ (t−s)A diag(1−x(t0))Ab(x(t0))ds
=
∞∑
k=0
βk+1
k!
∫ t
t0
(t−s)kds [A diag(1−x(t0))]k Ab(x(t0))
=
∞∑
k=0
(β(t−t0))k+1
(k+1)! [A diag(1−x(t0))]
k Ab(x(t0)). (27)
Therefore, from (25) and (27), we conclude that when y(t0) = yˆ(t0),
y(t)  yˆ(t), and thus x(t)  xˆ(t) in (24), where yˆ(t) is given by (12).
We next prove that
xˆ(t) = f (yˆ(t))  x˜(t), (28)
for all t ≥ t0. Without loss of generality, we set t0 = 0. To proceed,
we need the following lemma.
Lemma A.1. If
d xˆ(t)
dt
=
d f (yˆ(t))
dt
 d yˆ(t)
dt
 d x˜(t)
dt
, t ≥ 0, (29)
then (28) follows.
Proof. Since xˆ(t) and x˜(t) start from the same initial points, i.e.,
xˆ(0)= x˜(0)= x(0), the ordering of their derivatives in (29) implies
the ordering in (28) for all time t ≥ 0. 
It remains to show (29), which is a stronger sufficient condition,
to prove that (28) is satisfied. Together with (24), (28) implies (11).
First, by noting f (y)=1−e−y , observe that, for each i ,[
d f (yˆ(t))
dt
]
i
= e−yˆi (t )
dyˆi (t)
dt
≤ dyˆi (t)
dt
, (30)
for all t ≥ 0, where the inequality follows from e−y ≤ 1 for all
y ∈ [0,∞]. Then, letting D, diag(1−x(0)), we write again yˆ(t) in
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(12) with t0 = 0:
yˆ(t) = eβtADд(x(0)) +
∞∑
k=0
(βt)k+1
(k+1)! (AD)
kAb(x(0))
=
∞∑
k=0
(βt)k
k!
(AD)kд(x(0)) +
∞∑
k=0
(βt)k+1
(k+1)! (AD)
kAb(x(0)),
from the identity eβtAD =
∑∞
k=0
(βt )k
k ! (AD)k . It then follows that
d yˆ(t)
dt
= β
∞∑
k=1
(βt)k−1
(k−1)! (AD)
k−1ADд(x(0))
+ β
∞∑
k=0
(βt)k
k!
(AD)kAb(x(0))
= β
∞∑
k=0
(βt)k
k!
(AD)kA [Dд(x(0)) + b(x(0))]
= β
∞∑
k=0
(βt)k
k!
(AD)kAx(0) = eβtADβAx(0), (31)
where the third equality follows from
[Dд(x(0)) + b(x(0))]i = −(1 − xi (0)) log(1 − xi (0))
+ xi (0) + (1 − xi (0)) log(1 − xi (0)),
= xi (0), i = 1, 2, . . . ,n,
where д(x) = − log(1 − x) and b(x) = x + (1 − x) log(1 − x). From
(31), we have
d yˆ(t)
dt
= eβtADβAx(0)  eβAt βAx(0) = d x˜(t)
dt
, (32)
for all t ≥ 0, where the inequality follows since all the elements
of A and x(0) are non-negative with β > 0 and 1−xi (0) ≤ 1 on
the diagonal of D, and the last equality is from the fact that x˜(t) =
eβAt x(0) as given in (4). Therefore, (30) and (32) imply (29), and
thus (28) follows by Lemma A.1. This completes the proof of (11).
Lastly, recall the monotonicity property of x(t) over time t ,
i.e., x(t1)  x(t2) for any t1 ≤ t2, and x(∞) = 1. From (12), we
see that yˆi (t) is non-decreasing in time t and grows without
bound for all i . By f (y) = 1 − e−y , it follows that limt→∞ xˆi (t) =
limt→∞ f (yˆi (t)) = 1. In addition, from (4), we have limt→∞ x˜i (t) =
∞. Therefore, ‖xˆ(t) − x(t)‖ → 0 and ‖x˜(t) − x(t)‖ → ∞, as t → ∞.
This completes the rest of the proof.
B PROOF OF COROLLARY 5.2
For notational simplicity, let D , diag(1 − x(0)). We first consider
0 ≤ xi (0) < 1 for all i . We write again yˆ(t) in (12) with t0=0:
yˆ(t) = eβtADд(x(0)) +
∞∑
k=0
(βt)k+1
(k+1)! (AD)
kAb(x(0)). (33)
By noting that D is invertible since every diagonal entry of D is
positive, i.e., 1−xi (0)> 0, the second term in the RHS of (33) can be
written as
∞∑
k=0
(βt)k+1
(k+1)! (AD)
kAb(x(0)) =
∞∑
k=0
(βt)k+1
(k+1)! (AD)
kADD−1b(x(0))
=
∞∑
k=0
(βt)k+1
(k+1)! (AD)
k+1D−1b(x(0))
=
[
eβtAD − I
]
D−1b(x(0)), (34)
with
D−1 = diag
(
(1−x1(0))−1, 1−x2(0))−1, . . . , (1−xn(0))−1
)
.
Thus, from (33) and (34), we have
yˆ(t) = eβtAD [д(x(0)) + D−1b(x(0))] − D−1b(x(0))
= eβtADD−1x(0) − D−1x(0) + д(x(0))
= д(x(0)) +
[
eβtAD − I
]
D−1x(0), (35)
from д(x) = − log(1 − x) and b(x) = x + (1 − x) log(1 − x).
We next consider xi (0)=0 or xi (0)=1 for all i . Observe that the
first term in the RHS of (12) with t0=0 can be simplified to
eβtADд(x(0)) =
∞∑
k=0
(βt)k
k!
(AD)kд(x(0))
= Iд(x(0)) +
∞∑
k=1
(βt)k
k!
(AD)k−1ADд(x(0))
= д(x(0)), (36)
where the last equality follows from Dд(x(0))=0, since
[Dд(x(0))]i = −(1−xi (0)) log(1−xi (0)) = 0, for all i,
from xi (0)=0 or xi (0)=1 for all i . Thus, from (36), yˆ(t) in (12) with
t0=0 can be written as
yˆ(t) = д(x(0)) +
∞∑
k=0
(βt)k+1
(k+1)! (AD)
kAx(0),
where we have also used the identity b(x(0)) = x(0), i.e.,
b(xi (0)) = xi (0) + (1−xi (0)) log(1−xi (0)) = xi (0), for all i,
from xi (0)=0 or xi (0)=1 for all i .
C PROOF OF COROLLARY 5.3
Consider 0 ≤ xi (0) < 1 for all i . Letting D , diag(1 − x(0)), we
rewrite (13) as
yˆ(t) = eβtADD−1x(0) − D−1b(x(0)). (37)
Recall that µ1, µ2, . . . , µn are the eigenvalues of A diag(1 − x(0))
and µ1 = λ(A diag(1 − x(0))). Let uˆ1, uˆ2, . . . , uˆn and vˆ1, vˆ2, . . . , vˆn
be their associated left and right eigenvectors, respectively. They
are here normalized so that uˆTi vˆj = δi j , where δi j is Kronecker
delta [4, 42].
First, observe that since AD is diagonalizable, eβtAD can be de-
composed as [4, 42]
eβtAD =
n∑
k=1
eβµk t vˆk uˆ
T
k . (38)
Then, by noting that the non-negative matrix AD is irreducible
and aperiodic, the Perron-Frobenius theorem [42] implies that µ1=
λ(AD) is positive with µ1 > |µk | (k , 1) and its corresponding left
12
and right eigenvectors uˆ1 and vˆ1 have all positive components, i.e.,
uˆ1 ≻ 0 and vˆ1 ≻ 0, respectively. Thus, from (38), the first term in
the RHS of (37) can be written as
eβtADD−1x(0) =
n∑
k=1
eβµk t vˆk uˆ
T
k
D−1x(0) =
n∑
k=1
ξˆke
βµk t vˆk
= eβµ1t
(
ξˆ1vˆ1 +
n∑
k=2
ξˆke
−β (µ1−µk )t vˆk
)
, (39)
= ξˆ1e
βµ1t vˆ1
(
1 +O
(
e−mink≥2 |µ1−Re(µk ) |t
))
, (40)
where ξˆk , uˆ
T
k
D−1x(0)∈R for each k . By noting that µ1> 0, vˆ1≻0,
and ξˆ1 = uˆ
T
1 D
−1x(t0) > 0, (40) follows from that all the summands
in (39) decay exponentially fast in time t , since µ1 − µk > 0 for
k ≥ 2. It is worth noting that the eigenvalues µk , k ≥ 2, can pos-
sibly be complex-valued, as AD is no longer symmetric. Nonethe-
less, since µ1 −Re(µk ) > 0 for any k ≥ 2 is preserved, the factor
e−β (µ1−Re(µk ))t still makes its corresponding summand exponen-
tially decaying. Therefore, putting (40) in (37), we are done.
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